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there must be an adjudication of delinquency before the court can
22
order treatment leading to rehabilitation for the juvenile.
In adopting any one of these statutory interpretations, the
West Virginia courts should be mindful of the standards of fair
treatment considered by the New Jersey and Wisconsin courts. This,
however, should pose no problem, for West Virginia, like New
Jersey and Wisconsin, recognizes the underlying principles of the
juvenile court process:" [J]uvenile courts are not for punishment
but are instrumentalities for determining needs as to training
and guidance for the child's better physical, mental and moral
23
'
development."
While it is important that the juvenile process be utilized to
further the principles of care, guidance, treatment, and rehabilitation-those things which are in the best interest of the juvenile-it
is equally important that juveniles not be denied due process and
fair treatment by an unwarranted, overextended use of the statutory
discretion given to the juvenile courts. An interpretation of the
West Virginia statute24 will settle the question, if and when the
issue is raised.
George William Lavender, III

Pleading -

Real Subrogee is Not a Real Party
In Interest

In a diversity action in a federal court for damages resulting
from an automobile collision, the defendant moved that the
plaintiff's insurance carrier be joined as a party plaintiff. This
motion was made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, on the
grounds that the insurance carrier had paid plaintiff under his
deductible collision policy and was, therefore, subrogated to its insured's rights to that extent. This, it was contended, made the
insurance carrier a real party in interest under Federal Rule of
'The phrase in W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 5, § 14 (Michie 1966), "after the
proceedings" could easily be taken to mean, under a strict interpretation, that the
hearing must be completed and an adjudication of deliquency entered before
the court has the power to make one of the dispositions provided for in that
section.
57 W. VA. L. REv. 225, 226 (1955).
W. VA, CoEcgh.49, art. 5, § 14 (Michic 1966).
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Civil Procedure 17 (a). Held: Motion denied, since under West
Virginia law a partial subrogee would be treated as one with only
a contingent interest in the litigation and not one in whose name
an action could be prosecuted. Cleaves v. DeLauder, 302 F. Supp. 36
(N.D. W. VA. 1969).
Defendant argued that to join the partial subrogee would not
deprive the court of jurisdiction' and that failure to join the insurance company would subject the defendant to substantial risk
of double liability. The court pointed out that under the law of
West Virginia the rights of a partial subrogee are derivative and
he may not split the cause of action. 2
The plaintiff resisted the motion 3 by arguing that all parties
were aware of the subrogee's rights and that this motion was a
subtle way to inform the jury that an insurance company was involved. 4
The court recognized that the issue is a mixed question of
state substantive law and federal procedural law. 5 It endeavored to
determine the "real party in interest" as that party who has the
substantive right sought to be enforced. In order to determine
whether the insurance carrier has such a right the court referred
to the substantive law of West Virginia. On the other hand, the
'Cleaves v. DeLauder, 302 F. Supp. 36, 37 (N.D. W. Va. 1969).
'Id. at 38. The court in Cleaves cited State Farm v. Dewees, 143 W. Va. 75,
101 S.E.2d 273 (1967). In Dewees the plaintiff insurer had paid for property
damage to the insured's car. Insured had brought two previous actions, one
for personal injuries and one for property damages. The question of spitting the
cause of action went to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals by certification on the trial court's own motion. The decision (quoted in the Cleaves
case) was that:
By the very nature of the law governing subrogation, the insured having
no right to the claim asserted in the second action at law, there is no
debt or obligation due to the insurer from the alleged tort-feasors; and,
therefore, no basis upon which the purely equitable doctrine of subregation may be asserted. Id. at 82, 101 S.E.2d at 277.
See also, Mills v. Dewees, 141 W. Va. 782, 93 S.E2.d 484 (1956).
'Cleaves v. DeLander, 302 F. Supp. 36, 37 (N.D. W. Va. 1969).
'Normally the mere mention of the fact that an insurance company is involved in the litigation will be held to prejudice the jury. See Graham v. Wreston, 146 W. Va. 484, 120 S.E.2d 713 (1961); Bradford v. Board of Ed., 128 W. Va.
228, 86 S.E.2d 512 (1945); Lynch v. Alderson, 124 W. Va. 446, 20 S.E.2d 657
(1942).
'After discussion of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 804 U.S. 64 (1938) the court
concluded: "It appears settled beyond controversy that where the substance procedure distinction is important . . . the state substantive law determines the
nature of the interest sought to be enforced while the Federal Rules control the
procedural aspects of the litigation. Osborne v. Campbell, 37 F.R.D. 339 (S.D.
W. Va. 1965)" Cleaves v. DeLauder, 302 F. Supp. 36, 37 (N.D. W. Va. 1969).
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federal rules govern the question of whether the party having such
a right must be joined.6 The court relied on Erie R.R. v. Tomphins7
in making this distinction. That case held that a federal court must
apply the substantive law of the state in determining the rights of
the parties in diversity actions.8
The court cited Davidson's Inc. v. Scott,9 in determining the
substantive right of a partial subrogee under West Virginia law. In
that case the defendant moved that the plaintiff's insurance carrier
be joined under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 17 (a). The
trial court overruled the motion but indicated it would allow the
insurance companies' names to be disclosed.10 This ruling was apparently not attacked on appeal.
In an earlier federal case, Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Watts," the court held:
Where the owner of property, which has been destroyed
by fire through another's negligence, has been paid a part of
his loss by an insurer, who thereby becomes subrogated to
the ermedies of the assured, an action to recover from the wrongdoer the value of the property destroyed is properly brought in
the name of the assured alone and the insurer is neither a
necessary nor a proper party to such action.12
In a similar case in the tenth circuit,"a where an insurance carrier
had paid plaintiff for fire damage, the defendant made a motion
to have the carrier joined. In distinguishing the substantive and
procedural questions the court said: "The right of action against
the wrongdoer is substantive . ..but the person in whose name
the action may be brought is procedural, not substantive.' 4
In the Cleaves case the court reasoned that the partial subrogee's
interest is enforced by the insured, and that upon recovery the insured holds the proceeds in trust as to the amount of the subrogee's
share.1 5 It appears that the decision in Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph v. Watts, 6 followed the trust theory. In Cleaves the
'For a discussion of this problem see: Annot., 13 A.L.R.d 140 (1967).
1304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'Id. at 71.
9 149 W. Va. 470, 140 S.E.2d 807 (1965).
'Old. at 472, 140 S.E.2d at 808.
66 F. 460 (1895).
12Id. at 460.
Gas Service v. Hunt, 183 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1950).
' 4 Id. at 419.
"Cleaves v. DeLauder, 302 F. Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. W. VA. 1969).
"666 F. 4602 464 (1895). For a more extensive discussion on this topic see
Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1242 (1945).
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court apparently looked on this theory as controlling in West
Virginia.17
The Cleaves case raises an important question concerning the
effect of the Federal Rules, when the substantive law contradicts
the rule of procedure. This question is not answered by Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins,18 because that case only guides the court in applying
the substantive law to the issues concerning the rights of the
parties.1 9 The question is treated in Washington-Southern Navigatior4 Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. 20 This case
was decided on certificate from the third circuit and concerned a
motion under the Admiralty Rules of December, 1920. The rule,
provided for staying the proceedings on failure of the prosecuting
party to give security on a counterclaim. The argument against
the rule was that it would unjustly prohibit the claimant from
prosecuting the action solely because he was unable or unwilling
to post security bond. The court decided:
The right of a citizen of the United States to sue in a court
having jurisdiction of the parties and of the cause of action includes the right to prosecute his claim to judgment.... Occasionally, a rule is employed to express, in convenient form, as
applicable to certain classes of cases, a principal of substantive law which has been established by statute or decisions.
But no rule of court can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction.
Nor
2
can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law. 4
The holding in Washington-Southern has been applied to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2V In a case in the fifth circuit the
court declared Rule 25 (a) inapplicable in certain situations.23
Rule 17 (a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
states: "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest . . . and in subrogation and similar cases, the
court shall apply this subdivision as will promote justice." 24 A
' T Cleaves v. DeLauder, 302 F. Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. W. VA. 1969).
"804 U.S. 64 (1938).

"I9d.
'263 US. 629 (1926).
2

Id. at 635.
'See Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 365 F.2d 802, 813 (3rd Cir. 1966); Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir.

1956).

'Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (2th Cir. 1956). But see 77 HAV L. REy. 801,

808 (1964).
" M.

LucAR

L

L. SIvERsrETs,

W. VA. RULzs 159 (1960).
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commentator has suggested that in subrogation matters Rule 17 (a)
"in effect ...continues the former practice, leaving to local rule the
question whether an insurance company suing as subrogee must
sue in its own name or may sue in the name of the insured." ' 25
If the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals follows the
holding of the federal court in the Southern Bell case, and the
Cleaves case, it would appear that in cases of only partial subrogation the insurance carrier cannot be joined as a real party in interest. The problems involved in such a holding are apparent. First,
it would defeat the latitude given the trial court by the West Virginia rule, by taking the decision as to whether joining the party
would promote justice away from the trial court. Second, if the
insured brings an action against the tortfeaser the authority noted
in the Cleaves case would allow neither joinder26 nor a separate
action by the partial subrogee - if the insured failed to allege damages for that portion of the claim for which he had been com28
pensated.
Michael C. Allen

-Id. at 160.
: Cleaves v. DeLauder, 302 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. W. VA. 1969)1 Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Watts, 66 F. 460 (1895).
State Farm v. Dewees, 143 W. Va. 75, 101 S.E.2d 273 (1957).
For a discussion of related problems see 29A Am. JUR. INSURANCE § 1746
(1960).
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